My IVPT (prop jet) Engine Failure on Takeoff Finally Discussed

[Tom Sullivan]

I have been reluctant to discuss any details of my engine failure at 500’ during takeoff on Xmas Day, 2021, until the NTSB had concluded their investigation (and it was a painful subject to review). The investigation was concluded in August of 2023, nearly two years later. I actually wasn’t aware the investigation was closed until January of this year. This Lancair Live will be the only place with this level of detail on that fateful day.

I bought my Lancair kit in 1998, attended the two week Fast Build Program at the Lancair Factory in February of 1999, and received my kit the summer of 1999. I spent 17 years and 10,000 (no, that’s not a typo) hours building the plane, competing my first flight on November 14, 2016. I took 14 hours of training from the guru of Lancair Turboprops, John Cook and my first solo in the plane (at -25 F) was on my 61st birthday, December 18th.

I flew the plane for 5 years, 600 hours and half those flights were donated medical transportation flights. My last completed flight was two weeks before Xmas, 2021, for a 6 year old boy in medical care at Michigan’s U of M hospital. His flights of normally 2 hours or longer were nearly cut in half with my 300 knot/345 MPH Lancair. Sadly he passed in July of 2022.

We were heading to our Florida home on Spruce Creek Airport on Xmas Day. The last several years when we headed down a day or two after Xmas we were seeing ground holds of 1 1/2 to 4 hours due to the incredible exodus of northerners to Florida right after Xmas. I received no such delay on Xmas day, the very reason we planned it that way.

Everything was normal on the beautiful sunny winter morning in Iron Mountain, with moderate temps in the 20’s. The preflight was normal as well as initial takeoff northbound on Runway 01. I was using a “reduced power” takeoff engine setting, based on my annual yearly training with LOBO (Lancair Owners & Builders Organization) so after retracting the landing gear and wing flaps, I was starting to add in power and adjust the engine RPM to climb settings……….but something was not right? I wasn’t getting the “pull” from the 724 HP Propjet engine I was accustomed to. And the engine didn’t sound as loud.

I looked at my panel and had a warning light, GCU FAIL. I knew the Generator Control Unit had failed but that wouldn’t have given me the current problem. I looked down at my engine monitor and saw all parameters dropping, fast ………. I had an engine failure. I looked at my altimeter and I was at 500’, I needed 800’ to make a 180 turn back, based on my regular training events. My options were out the front window. The Menominee River was below me, with fresh ice and unknown thickness. I didn’t want to land safely and then drown in a river. To the right was inhospitable terrain and lots of homes on the river. I looked northwest and it looked like our best option.

I checked a minimum of emergency items, briefly considered a re-light, but knew the process would take longer than I had before hitting trees, and I would likely stall the plane during the distraction so I picked what looked like a small opening in the woods. Beth asked “are we going in?”, I didn’t answer …… I was too focused and busy trying accomplish a landing we might survive. I found the urge to pull the stick back INCREDIBLY HARD TO RESIST as the wings started slapping the tree tops! Had I, we would have stalled and died. I left the gear up, realizing the rough terrain would cause more harm than good. (That’s probably the ONE decision, at that point, that later made the possibility of rebuilding the plane an option ).

The landing was extremely rough, with 3’ moguls and pieces being ripped off the plane. We came to a stop turned 100 degrees to the right. The bottom of the plane was very smooth, it was like sliding on a sled in the snow. I looked at Beth and incredulously said “I can’t believe we’re alive !!”. She said “let’s get out of here before it starts on fire !!”. We walked from the plane, me with a small cut on my face and her with a sore back from the impact against her seat belt. The flight had lasted 52 seconds.

I had an airliner on approach when we departed so checked to see if I could transmit on my radio (I couldn’t, the entire engine had torn off and was resting with the prop pushing up against the firewall). I had cell coverage so called 911. They answered with “ This is 911 ….. what’s your emergency?” Sounding like she gets more BS calls than actual emergencies. When I told her what happened I think she sat up in her chair. Anyway, my first concern was to have them call Minneapolis Center and advise them we had an engine failure on takeoff, were sitting in the woods, and had no serious injuries.

The 911 operator wouldn’t let me terminate the call, and I had friends at the airport, that likely could have found us sooner, calling me. I kept telling them I could hear the sirens but they needed to go farther east and south. Finally after 80 minutes, I looked over and saw my Stratus still sitting on Velcro on my glare shield “blinking”, so I grabbed my iPad. It was still open to Foreflight, with my VFR Chart up, and my location was surging with a blue dot. I touched it and my long and lats displayed. I gave them to the 911 dispatcher and 15 minutes later a sheriffs deputy came tracking through the 12” of snow finding us.

Beth was sent to Wausau by helicopter, probably a result of the helicopter called during the initial 911 call and it was sitting at the hospital. She was complaining of back pain but by 5 PM she was discharged after X-rays and a MRI finding no “new” back injuries. A couple friends drove me over to be with her and took our car AND theirs so we had a vehicle to return home, either that day or the next (we came home that day).

The sheriffs department and rescue workers gave up their Xmas morning saving us, for which we were extremely grateful. A post by them afterwards, trying to update the public what all the commotion was about, on their Facebook page, unfortunately noted the short road near the landing site. Friends later said that rural road had traffic like the U.S. Highway a few miles away. Many saw the tracks from the rescue crews in the snow, walked in and violated a FAA Secure accident scene. I had not closed the airplane door, so concerned for Beth, and found the next day someone stole my $1200 Bose headset. They obviously had no clue how it was plugged in (the Lemo plug model) so literally tore the end off to steal it. In retrospect, maybe a more vague location noted on Facebook would have kept the accident site from becoming a circus scene.

I heard from the NTSB within hours, the FAA FSDO Rep on Sunday, the 26th, and met the FSDO Rep on scene on Monday morning. The plane was released to me by 10 AM, and completely recovered to my hangar by 3 PM on Monday, the 27th.

I have the Garmin G3X so the NTSB downloaded the data cards 6 weeks later. The fuel flow was documented as reducing, 4 seconds after lift off, over 20+ seconds. I had fuel pressure until we touched the ground. The Fuel Control Unit (FCU) was removed and sent to my engine shop in Deland for inspection and ran on a stand. He found no issues with it, but the FCU is a very complex engine control with a lot of springs, diaphragms and seals in it. It bounced around the back of a UPS truck for nearly 2,000 miles before arriving in Deland FL. I suspect whatever item stuck or failed was rattled loose before it arrived.

The FCU was sent to Walter’s for tear down and inspection. Nothing was found by them either. I have a good friend that is an Executive Recruiter for the aviation field. He told me a few years before finishing the plane he had helped GE hire the executive that later ended up on the GE Acquisition of Walters. Knowing about my project he asked this Executive later what GE thought of the Walters engine when they purchased the company. The executive noted it was a great engine, they would continue manufacturing of it in the Czech Republic, but were concerned about the FCU. They intended to (and have since done it) redesign and upgrade the FCU.

The original Walters FCU is no longer available from Walters. Only the GE updated FCU can be purchased. Mine has recently been ordered for my new engine, going into my plane during my current ongoing rebuild.

Oh, on the NTSB Report, mostly accurate except for a couple key details, determined cause of engine failure UNDETERMINED. Pretty much what I expected. I’ve since been advised of several other Walters FCU failures, very similar to mine. I asked if Walters would use my “core” for my reconditioned FCU and they stated it will never be put on an airplane again, thus NO (I guess finding nothing wrong doesn’t make them comfortable they actually know what failed). In addition, my FSDO rep is going to conduct the Airworthiness inspection on another IVPT I am completing. SInce he was one of the individuals that alerted me to another similar Walters FCU failure, he was rather reluctant about certifying another IVPT with the old Walters FCU. To his relief, that one now has the new GE FCU on it as well.

Tom

[Rock Barchfeld]

Hi Tom,

A tragic tale, sadly with out a definitive answer, the silver lining being you both walked away...

One question if I might? You included the term, "reduced power takeoff" in your narrative. I'm quite familiar with the topic in regards to transport category aircraft, but never heard it used in relation to IV-PTs. I've searched everywhere I can think of to get more information regarding this as it pertains to our turboprops but have found nothing. I've owned mine for about 4 years with 1 initial and 3 recurrent training events, nobody has ever brought up the subject, nor can I find it in any training literature. Was this a John Cook, (never had the chance to meet him), thing, an input from a LOBO instructor, or ???

I hope I'm not picking at a scab, not my intention in the least, just looking for info on another technique which might be useful. If you do not have the time or the inclination to respond, I totally understand.

It appears you're making great progress in your rebuild, clearly you know what you're doing and how to get it done. I've only helped build one airplane, but I recall the adage, 50% done, only 90% left to go. Best to you and your helpers in this effort.

I hope to run into you at Pelston in June.

Rock

[Tom Sullivan]

Rock,

First off, feel free to ask anything….even tough or uncomfortable questions.

As far as the reduced power take off it goes back to John teaching me full power take offs. Basically throttle it up to 660 ITT unless torque limited, then at maximum torque or 660 ITT, whichever was less.

LOBO president, Jeff Edwards, got called out on a triple fatal resulting from an engine failure on takeoff and the inexperienced pilot (NOT trained by John) was incapable of reacting fast enough getting the nose down from the aggressive climb attitude quick enough and stalled in, killing all 3 on board.

LOBO adopted the policy of using a slightly lower ITT limit on initial takeoff. The plane was designed around 350 HP, so taking off a bit short of 724 HP is still well above the original recip power.

If you flew with Chris, and were using the max power settings I was taught, you would have been called out on it. Either way, if in doubt ask Chris R.

Thanks for the kind words on my rebuild!

Tom

[Rock Barchfeld]

Tom,

Thanks for the reply and the background information regarding the reduced power technique. Got to love aviation, as there are always several ways to skin the cat.

Like you, I look for that 800' AGL number every takeoff. For the non turbine folks, a return to base from an engine failure at 800' is entirely doable, and we train for it, (see Tom's narrative). I'm sure there is an equivalent number for the recip community, but I have no idea what it is. I use 660 ITT or 100% torque power for takeoff and claw for that first 1000' of altitude at about 120-125 Kts. (Takes about 30-35 seconds from the time you break ground). I do, however, leave the flaps out until passing the 800' number, thought being should things go sideways I already have the flaps stall margin available and I can start the turn when it looks about right only having to get the nose down and prop into feather, now. Off setting slightly from runway heading in the direction of flight can be beneficial depending on the airport/runway etc.

I'm not attempting to preach to the choir, nor bore those with different airframes, just putting this out for consideration. I base this technique on single engine helicopter approach philosophy. In a helicopter there can be a point during a departure or approach where, should the engine fail, you have neither the airspeed or altitude available to transition to an autorotation. You want to avoid that area, or if not possible, transition it as quickly as possible. Also known as reducing your exposure to the threat. Good or bad idea? Just putting it out there as food for thought.

If I'm missing something, or anybody sees a glaring error in my thinking, I'm all ears and would listen to any critiques

Rock Out.

[jedwards]

Rock,

Let me correct and comment on the revision to takeoff procedures in the IVPT.

A couple NON LOBO instructors were teaching full power takeoffs in the IVPT. With the 120 KIAS restriction after takeoff due to nose gear door limitations, pilots were taught to pitch up aggressively to stay below 120 KIAS until the gear were up and locked. This likely led to some loss of control accidents, including the three fatal in Georgia. That aircraft had been repaired for a nose gear door damage due to exceeding 120 KIAS during retraction. I was not a party to that accident but learned that the instructor told the NTSB he was a LOBO instructor. He was not and never was a LOBO instructor.

After a previous board member received training in his new to him IVPT from another non LOBO CFI, that person contacted me to discuss the issues of the full power takeoff. I agreed that full power takeoffs IVPT are destabilizing due to the above factors. It is not uncommon for many single engine turbo prop aircraft to limit shaft horsepower on takeoff. The TBM 700 series and Evolution come to mind. The TBM and Evolution are both equipped with 750 shp engines, like the IVPT, yet limit the takeoff power due to issues related to P factor. Simple put, there is not enough rudder at low airspeeds to effectively counter those left turning forces. Guess which aircraft has the smallest rudder with the shortest moment arm? Yep ... the IVPT.

Since implementing these training changes we have had no loss of control accidents on takeoff in the IVPT.

Best regards,

Jeff Edwards